Nordic nations introduce advanced 5G military applications. If the Pentagon can innovate abroad, there is no excuse not to do it at home

When you share a 956-mile border with Russia, squandering military resources like spectrum is not an option. For Nordic nations, the threat of Russian invasion is not theoretical; it’s a lived reality etched in memory. This urgency drives the Nordics to lead in 5G military innovation through a commercial-first approach to spectrum allocation. These countries prioritize their militaries’ access to cutting-edge wireless technologies for defense. Norway, Finland, and Sweden recently showcased the world’s first cross-border 5G military “slicing” across an area the size of Texas, California, and Montana combined, using a band believed to be the 3.5 GHz and involving more than 10,000 troops. By contrast, the U.S. military has conducted limited tests on a few domestic bases. The US may boast high 5G penetration amongst consumers and enterprises, but its military lags behind allies and adversaries on critical 5G capabilities. Further, an empty spectrum pipeline threatens to upend the 5G experience Americans enjoy today.

5G technology is characterized by high speed, low latency, and massive connectivity. Key military 5G applications include enhanced Command and Control (C2) Communications for precision-guided munitions and real-time battlefield coordination; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) for rapid transmission of high-resolution video, radar, and signal intelligence data to command centers; autonomous systems and drones for swarming of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), autonomous ground vehicles, and remotely operations; Augmented and Virtual Reality (AR/VR) for immersive simulations for military training, mission rehearsal, and maintenance; and Smart Logistics and IoT Integration for smart warehousing, just-in-time inventory management, and real-time asset tracking.

The Swedish Armed Forces will use commercial mobile networks to supplement to their own operations in times of peace, crisis, and war. They plan to leverage the latest 3GPP standard (5G and future generations) to ensure fast and secure communication, data sharing, and real-time command and control. The strategy also includes interoperability with NATO and neighboring countries, as well as the ability for local coverage and autonomous networks. The collaboration include mobile operators, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), and the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS), and aims to contribute to a robust, future-oriented system where civilian and military resources work together.

Some suggest that militaries, given their specialized needs, should build and run their own communications networks; however, most practitioners push back against that view, noting  the high cost, complexity, and limited scale of government communications networks. Military applications, with fewer users and specific needs, require less bandwidth than the diverse, data-heavy consumer and enterprise applications which are saturated with video streaming and advertising. The U.S. military could thrive with a leaner, smarter spectrum portfolio, leveraging 5G slicing for efficiency. Commanders would rather leverage best in class commercial technology than invent it themselves.

Meanwhile Denmark is driving its partnership with the US military even closer by fast-tracking a law granting the U.S. military unfettered access to its airwaves during crisis or war. This aligns with existing U.S. law in which the military can commandeer spectrum and private networks under specific conditions, temporarily displacing civilian use. Denmark’s move reflects both politics and pragmatism: a deep, historical U.S.-Denmark security partnership, dating back to the founding of the American Republic, and a recognition that prioritizing spectrum for commercial innovation maximizes economic gains and advanced security. Auctions and taxes from commercial spectrum use generate revenue to fund military advancements. If deterrence and diplomacy succeed, the U.S. military will never need Denmark’s spectrum. But in a crisis, access to modern 5G applications and technology will be critical. Denmark’s bold spectrum law underscores a critical lesson: prioritizing commercial innovation in spectrum allocation strengthens both economic growth and national security.

See Strand Consult’s research notes and reports on spectrum.

If the Pentagon can innovate abroad for 5G, there is no excuse not to do it at home.

The U.S. has been known as a spectrum leader, pioneering Nobel-prize winning spectrum auction design, flexible frequency use, record-breaking auction revenue, and fast-tracking mobile infrastructure deployment. However, progress has stalled. The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) spectrum authority remains expired since 2023, and the spectrum pipeline is dry, risking degraded mobile service and constrained broadband connectivity for Americans.

The U.S. military, occupying prime spectrum in the USA for almost a century, has opposed efforts to modernize allocation, creating a bottleneck. However, it’s a different story abroad. The U.S. military operates near 5G deployed in the 3.5 MHz band in countries where it has a significant presence or conducts joint operations, including NATO member countries, Indo-Pacific allies (Phillippines, Japan, South Korea, Australia), Middle Eastern partners (Bahrain, Qatar), and regions with active operations (Iraq, Syria).

China has capitalized on the U.S. spectrum statis in recent years, surging from 17th to first in 5G availability through aggressive mid-band spectrum allocation and rapid deployment. China leverages its 5G networks to export innovation, dominating global markets for devices, applications, and standards. Its goal is to lead AI warfare, including electronic warfare, by 2030.

The Russian military has also demonstrated advanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, particularly in GPS jamming, spoofing, and radio signal disruption, which it has used effectively in Ukraine, Syria, and along NATO’s eastern flank. Its systems, such as Krasukha and Tirada, can degrade satellite communications, radar, and drone links—posing a serious threat to Western reliance on precision navigation and networked operations. The U.S., isolated by its fragmented spectrum approach, risks technological irrelevance.

Not all NATO nations can partner with the USA on 5G.

The European Commission, European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), and the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communication (BEREC) developed an EU-wide coordinated risk assessment. Based upon a set of identified risks, the EU 5G Toolbox was developed and agreed to include strategic (non-technical) and technical mitigating measures. In sum, the European Commission and the EU member states implement key measures in two areas; strategic (non-technical) and technical security measures, both of these assessments and mitigation measures must be satisfied to deem 5G equipment suppliers as secure and trusted.

However some EU nations have not implemented the EU 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox and still host a large share of Chinese equipment in their 5G infrastructure. The countries with 5G equipment from Chinese vendors include Germany (59% of the 5G infrastructure), Italy (32% of the 5G infrastructure), Netherlands (37% of the 5G infrastructure), Bulgaria (65% of the 5G Infrastructure), and Spain (32% of the 5G infrastructure).

Some EU nations and operators have cited their interest in adopting OpenRAN as a reason for delaying the replacement of Chinese equipment. However, OpenRAN has yet to meet the expectations initially set by its proponents. In 2024, it experienced a decline in market share, which remains relatively small overall. Many operators are hesitant to introduce greater complexity into their networks, particularly by integrating numerous smaller vendors with limited resources.

However, this reliance on Chinese vendors creates significant challenges for military partnerships inside NATO. The U.S. military, operating a number of bases and installations in Germany with 35,000 troops, requires secure communications for operations, intelligence, and coordination with allies. When American troops, support staff, and their families purchase local personal communications services in countries using Chinese networks, their data may be transmitted over infrastructure vulnerable to espionage or cyberattacks, posing risks to operational security. This incompatibility undermines trust and interoperability in joint NATO and bilateral operations, as the U.S. prioritizes secure, non-Chinese networks for its communications, particularly for sensitive military applications like 5G-enabled command and control or ISR.

NATO will never accept using networks with equipment from untrusted vendors like Huawei and ZTE ; its rules prohibit procurement of sensitive equipment from communist countries China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam.

Solutions based on Chinese equipment are unlikely to be compatible with the EU’s new ReArm Europe Plan – Readiness 2030. This initiative aims to rebuild European defense capabilities, starting with significant and sustained investment. The EU has committed to accelerating progress across all areas in order to urgently enhance defense readiness. The goal is to establish a strong and self-sufficient European defense posture by 2030, thereby strengthening Europe’s contribution to transatlantic security and cooperation within NATO.

In contrast, the Nordics (Denmark and Sweden), the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, formerly part of the Soviet Union), and Luxembourg have either removed all Chinese equipment or never deployed it, aligning their networks with U.S. and NATO security standards and facilitating seamless military cooperation.

See Strand Consult’s benchmarks of trusted and non-trusted vendors in European mobile networks and its library on mobile network security.

US House advances spectrum policy.

Fortunately, US leaders are seizing the moment. The “One Big Beautiful Bill Act of 2025” (OBBBA) passed the House of Representatives. The bill budgets $88 billion in revenue from future FCC spectrum auctions and preempted states from regulating artificial intelligence for 10 years. The related Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report notes fiscal savings of $988 billion over 10 years. The House bill proposes restoring FCC authority to auction spectrum through 2034 and mandates the identification of 600 MHz of spectrum for exclusive, licensed use. The bill ensures flexibility of frequencies to be identified through an inter-agency process.

The US President tweeted his support, noting the need for U.S. leadership in wireless technologies and national security. The bill goes to the Senate for passage, and Senate Commerce Committee Chair Ted Cruz has already teed up spectrum priorities with the expectation for the Senate to pass its version of the bill this summer.

Nordic nations have already demonstrated what’s possible by pioneering cross-border 5G military integration using a commercial-first model—proving that innovation and defense readiness can go hand in hand. The US should take not. It must restore its auction authority, revitalize its spectrum pipeline, modernize military spectrum allocation, and reclaim 5G/6G leadership from China. Failure to act risks ceding technological dominance to adversaries like China and Russia, which are aggressively advancing their capabilities. By prioritizing a commercial-first, innovation-driven approach, the U.S. can unlock 5G’s full potential for its military and citizens, securing a connected, competitive future and strengthening deterrence and warfare capabilities. If the Pentagon can adopt innovative spectrum practices abroad, it has no excuse for lagging at home.

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