How to ensure NATO´s next generation weapons access to modern communication solutions
Strand Consult’s report “How to ensure NATO´s next generation weapons access to modern communication solutions” explores EU and Spanish legislation to ensure secure telecom infrastructure. The report is a template for NATO country operators and authorities.
The background for the report is that NATO hold their 2025 Summit in the Hague 24-25 June. This will mean good news for some mobile operators, bad news for others. In the report “How to ensure NATO´s next generation weapons access to modern communication solutions”. and in this note, we will look at the new commercial opportunities. Based on the Spanish market, we will look at what it takes for modern telecommunications companies to realize the business opportunities that NATO´s new investment plans will result in.
In the Hague 32 NATO countries got together to discuss the framework for future cooperation and the level of defense spending. We already know that most NATO countries will increase their military spending to 3.5 percent of GDP on “hard defense” that will include weapons and troops and an additional 1.5 percent on defense-related investments such as cybersecurity and military mobility by 2035.
Modern weapons require modern communications
All countries across NATO are in the process of modernizing the defense systems, gigantic sums will be invested in new and advanced equipment. The shopping list is very long, on the other hand, all these new defense solutions have in common that they need access to modern communication solutions.
In the telecommunications industry, there has been talk for many years about how mobile companies can gain access to new sources of revenue. 5G and not least 5G private networks have received a lot of attention. Conversely, there has not been much talk about what communication solutions the defense system needs in the future.
The war in Ukraine and shifting geopolitical realities have dramatically changed perspectives in recent years. There is now a fundamentally different understanding of why and how defense investments must be made. We live in a world in which Russia has invaded Ukraine; China counts Russia, North Korea, and Iran as allies; and these countries support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
For those working in telecommunications, it’s worth asking how these developments relate to the industry and how NATO’s work might impact telecom operators across and perhaps beyond the alliance. Our new report “How to ensure next generation weapons and modern communication solutions for NATO” and this note provides insight into the ongoing developments and our perspective on what lies ahead.
Strand Consult believes that these experiments will set the course for how mobile operators and defense forces will work together in the future and cited the recent example of the transnational project of Nordic defense forces cooperating with advanced 5G military applications and 5G slicing.
In our note NATO has good news for some mobile operators, bad news for others , we have described how NATO views 5G and the given technological requirements. There is no doubt that the 5G mobile infrastructure that exists in most countries will play a central role in the communication solutions used by the Armed Forces. Mobile operators in Norway, Sweden and Finland, together with the national defense and NATO, have already showed how it can be done.
5G mobile infrastructure can upgrade military communications with applications for C2, ISR, UAVs, AR/VR and Smart Logistics and IoT.
Such cooperation between NATO, the Armed Forces and commercial telecommunications companies will likely be expanded in the coming years. Commercial telecommunications networks will likely be included in the EU’s €800 billion plan “ReArm Europe Plan/ Readiness 2030.”
In Strand Consult’s recent mapping of Chinese telecom infrastructure across 31 European countries we document that the defense sector faces a significant challenge in several countries there can’t provide access to a single national network free from untrusted vendors.
Spain’s Challenge
One of the countries that has already said that they cannot or will not live up to the new 5% NATO target is Spain. A few days before the meeting, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez sent a clear signal that Spain would not contribute to the community in the same way that their military contribution to the war in Ukraine has been quite limited.
Strand Consult´s latest study Is there a correlation between European nations’ level of Chinese telecom equipment, the consumption of Russian energy, and military aid to Ukraine? document that 32% of Spain’s 5G infrastructure comes from China. In 3 years, Spain has given 0.79 billion euros in military support to Ukraine. In 2024, Spain spent €2.60 billion on Russian energy, equivalent to 0.17% of Spain’s GDP. Spain has provided 0.018% of Spain’s GDP in military aid to Ukraine.
In Denmark none of the 5G infrastructure comes from China. In 3 years, Denmark has given 7.54 billion euros in military support to Ukraine. In 2024, Denmark spent 0.02 billion euros on Russian energy, equivalent to 0.05% of Denmark’s GDP. Denmark has provided 0.67% of Denmark’s GDP in military aid to Ukraine.
In the EU, work is being done to ensure that consumers, companies and, not least, actors who operate critical infrastructure have access to modern communication solutions from trusted vendors. Part of this work is described in the EU’s 5G Toolbox.
The foundation for the implementation of EU’s 5G Toolbox in Spain is called “The National 5G Cybersecurity Scheme” (ENS5G that law was approved on April 30, 2024.
The key problem is that the law ENS5G doesn’t establish any timeline to initiate a procedure. In practice, this means that despite the law being passed in the parliament and Spain having told that to EU, they have not made a timeline / plan for how the law should be implemented.
In our latest report “How to ensure next generation weapons and modern communication solutions for NATO” we describe the legislation that exists in the EU and in Spain to ensure that modern Spain can have access to secure infrastructure. We have mapped the infrastructure that exists from untrusted vendors in Spain at the same time as we have described some of the contracts that Spanish telecom companies have entered into with The Ministry of Defense, Guardia Civil, The Spanish Navy and others. We are talking about contracts where the communication solutions are based on equipment from the suppliers that the Spanish Parliament and the European Union believe should not be used in Spain.
The purpose of the report “How to ensure next generation weapons and modern communication solutions for NATO” is to create the transparency that does not exist in Spain, but also in a number of other EU countries that have not implemented the EU’s 5G Toolbox. We believe that the Spanish case is a good case to start from when looking at how new and modern weapons in NATO can’t get access to modern communication solutions from trusted vendors.
For more discussion of the security policy, see Strand Consult CEO John Strand’s presentation in the Senate of Spain The new geopolitical reality: how to build and protect information society infrastructure.
5G and Defense
Modern militaries cannot function without secure, advanced, and integrated communications. 5G is the go-to solution for its speed, security, and adaptability. Indeed, private 5G networks are explored for ways for NATO and allied militaries can utilize mobile networks operated by private companies.
NATO does not use equipment from countries like China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran. Indeed, NATO’s procurement rules prohibit its contracting with communist countries. NATO would not purchase Chinese fighter jets from Chengdu Aircraft Corporation and Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, nor Huawei network equipment. The rationale is that ill-advised to acquire critical supplies from one’s adversary. Think only of Greek gift of the Trojan Horse.
A mobile operator must seamlessly integrate its 5G communication solutions with those used by individual NATO countries to effectively support military operations. This capability was successfully demonstrated during the NATO exercise Joint Viking 2025.
The key question now is which mobile operators will be selected to provide these critical solutions and which will be excluded. Equally important is whether some countries will be unable to offer such advanced solutions to their national defense and NATO allies because of security concerns.
The Operators in NATO countries which have chosen to use equipment from Huawei and ZTE are unlikely to be invited as suppliers. Such decisions are likely to deem a network solution untrustworthy and disqualify the provider to deliver communication solutions to the military.
Since 2018, Strand Consult has analyzed and mapped the use of Chinese technology in mobile networks across 61 countries. The 2025 update is here: Is there a correlation between European nations’ level of Chinese telecom equipment, the consumption of Russian energy, and military aid to Ukraine?
A significant number of operators have chosen to use Chinese equipment in all or parts of their networks. Some of the largest Europe operators will probably not qualify as suppliers to NATO.
In 2023 Commissioner Thierry Breton announced EU would limit procurement of telecom services from operators that don’t comply with the EU’s 5G Toolbox especially those using Chinese technology to build and operate their networks.
The EU’s Cybersecurity Risk Evaluation and Scenarios emphasize telecommunications security. This work, among other efforts, forms the foundation of the 5G Toolbox and the EU’s stance on the use of Chinese equipment in critical infrastructure.
European mobile operators will increasingly be divided into two groups: those qualified to supply NATO, the EU, and other entities requiring secure communications, and those which don’t.
Operators failing to meet these requirements will likely face a competitive disadvantage, as their rivals use security certifications from authorities and NATO as selling points to customers which demand trusted communication services. The presence of risky equipment in a network could also inhibit the use of cutting-edge AI application providers like Datenna, Thales, Czechoslovak Group (CSG), Palantir, Anduril, Skydio, and Shield AI.
Opportunities for Telecom Operators
Geopolitical shifts like China’s alliance with Russia demand secure 5G networks for NATO. Operators with untrusted vendors like Huawei face exclusion, while others thrive.
The world is changing rapidly. China is not the same country it was ten years ago. Today, China considers Russia, Iran and North Korea its allies. These countries seek to undermine democracies in the free world.
China assists Russia in its war on Ukraine. Chinese mobile network providers delivered 4G networks to Crimea after Russia’s 2014 invasion. Thousands of North Korean soldiers are fighting on Russia’s side in the war against Ukraine. War is being waged on European soil with the tacit approval of the Chinese government.
Daily news reports describe how Chinese government affiliated hackers target critical infrastructure, including telecommunications, energy systems, government departments, and public officials. A Chinese ship has been implicated in sabotage of a subsea cable near Taiwan. These represent China’s increasingly sophisticated campaign of electronic warfare.
Strand Consult foresaw this development in its 2019 research note “Telecoms operators’ next big challenge is the 100,000 Chinese hackers attacking their corporate customers every day.”
Recently the European Union and its Member States, together with international partners, expressed solidarity with Czechia following a malicious cyber campaign that targeted its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Czechia determined that the cyberattack was carried out by Advanced Persistent Threat 31 (APT31), a group associated with the Chinese government.
Going forward, mobile operators are likely to be tapped to deliver an increasing share of military communications. This will happen through partnerships involving the national defense sector and the mobile operators that build and operate national mobile networks.
The EU’s 5G Toolbox is a starting point. As 5G networks connect critical systems, energy, water, transport, and industry its security is vital for security, autonomy, and national defense. Beyond mobile networks, Denmark and others are applying this risk assessment approach to broader telecom and infrastructure systems. A new Danish law directs assessment of telecommunications equipment and requires removal of equipment from non-trusted vendors. This Investment Screening Act forms the foundation for the Danish National Strategy for Cyber and Information Security. The assessment is performed by The Centre for Cyber Security (CFCS).
Operators that have chosen to use equipment from suppliers like Huawei and ZTE are unlikely to meet the security requirements. The qualification review and exercise which will be undertaken among the 32 NATO countries and many other nations around the world aligned with NATO, countries like Japan, the Philippines, and others. Countries which consider China a military partner (Pakistan, Belarus, and Cambodia) use Huawei and ZTE equipment.
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