Research Notes
China Cyber Security

Greenland, USA and Denmark – Ménage à trois, what it means for the telecommunications industry

11 Jan 2026

The media is overflowing with stories about Trump and Greenland. This week Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen and Greenlandic Foreign Minister Vivian Motzfeldt will meet with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, further fueling headlines and speculation.

We at Strand Consult, based in Copenhagen and working extensively with telecom & geopolitics, have received inquiries from around the world wanting to understand what is going on. This note gathers key facts and context to judge whether the prevailing media narrative reflects reality—or political theater.

This matters for the telecommunications industry. Strategic misreadings in the Arctic can translate into regulatory, security, and investment consequences for telecom operators, particularly in NATO countries. If you work in this industry, ignoring Greenland is no longer an option.

Reading the headlines, one might conclude that Trump is preparing either to buy Greenland or to invade it. Neither scenario is realistic. Greenland will not become American, and the United States will not use military force against Greenland or the Kingdom of Denmark. What is unfolding instead is a familiar case of media inflation—one that conveniently serves Danish domestic politics at a moment when both the prime minister and the foreign minister face serious electoral headwinds. Trump, unsurprisingly, is enjoying the provocation, while parts of the U.S. administration are content to play along. Every political game has rules. This one is no exception. The rules may be complex, but they are visible—and understanding them is essential to making sense of what is happening between the United States, Denmark, and Greenland.

This note examines Denmark’s unmet commitments to the United States on Greenland, European politics, Greenland, the special envoy to Greenland, the continuity of U.S. Arctic policy—and the implications for the telecommunications industry and critical infrastructure. This matters for telecom because credibility failures in the Arctic translate directly into regulatory, vendor, and network risk.

Denmark in Election Mode: Crisis as a Political Asset.

Denmark is currently governed by a majority coalition consisting of the Social Democrats, led by Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen; the Moderates, led by Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen; and the Liberal Party, led by Defence Minister Troels Lund-Poulsen. The government took office on 15 December 2022, which means that a general election must be called no later than 31 October 2026. At the time of its formation, the coalition was presented as a broad centrist project with a parliamentary majority. This particular construction was novel, designed by the former Liberal prime minister and founder of the “new” Moderate Party, Lars Løkke Rasmussen. While cross-bloc cooperation has long been a feature of Danish politics (the so-called “cooperation across the middle” or samarbejde over midten), the Løkke Rasmussen model was at that time an innovation to institutionalize cross-bloc cooperation as a permanent governing majority rather than ad hoc agreements.

Despite implementing various policies that would traditionally be considered successful, all three governing parties are performing poorly in polls. In both the EU elections in the summer of 2025 and the municipal elections in November 2025, the governing parties suffered significant losses. Current polling suggests that the Social Democrats could fall from 50 to 30 seats, the Moderates from 16 seats to none, and the Liberals from 23 to 21 seats. Including the three seats allocated to Greenland and the Faroe Islands, the coalition today holds 89 seats; after the next election, that number is projected to drop to approximately 51—well below the 90 seats required to form and sustain a majority government in Denmark.

Historically, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen polled best during periods of crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the early days of war in Ukraine, and now the tensions surrounding Greenland. She demonstrated leadership during emergency. Acting decisively—but in a manner later judged unconstitutional—she secretly ordered the culling of Denmark’s entire mink population, approximately 15 million animals, in November 2020, based on a risk assessment from the Statens Serum Institut (SSI). A subsequent state commission concluded that the decision violated Danish law, and compensation to mink farmers—whose industry had been one of Denmark’s most profitable exports—ultimately cost taxpayers around €4 billion, or roughly €700 per Dane.

Put bluntly, both Mette Frederiksen and Lars Løkke Rasmussen have a strong political incentive for the Greenland issue to remain unresolved—and possibly to escalate—so long as it does not appear that they are the ones driving the escalation. At present, the political trajectory points toward both losing power in the next election, with the libertarian Liberal Party (Venstre), under Troels Lund-Poulsen, is likely to play a central role in forming a non-socialist government that excludes both the Social Democrats and the Moderates.

Why Greenland Suddenly Matters—and Why Telecom Should Pay Attention.

Strand Consult has worked with Greenland for more than 25 years. Tele Greenland—now Tusass—has been a client. Over the years I have built close professional and personal relationships across Greenland. I also served on the Arctic Economic Council’s advisory board on telecommunications, where I contributed to the mapping of telecommunications infrastructure across the Arctic region. For Strand Consult, Greenland is not an abstraction or an exotic outpost. It is part of the Danish royal realm, history, and nation state like the Faroe Islands (pop.55,000).

Acknowledging the strategic logic behind U.S. Arctic policy is not an endorsement of President Trump’s conduct or language, but a recognition that these concerns are structural, bipartisan, and enduring. After more than a decade of Trump operating in full public view, the claim that he is inscrutable says less about Trump than about the unwillingness to analyze what he actually says and does. Some argue that Trump has “short-circuited all logic in international politics.” That claim is both wrong and partly right. He has undoubtedly disrupted established norms, but he is also remarkably predictable if one listens carefully to what he says and understands how he frames power, leverage, and obligation.

In the analysis that follows, we examine Denmark’s promises to Trump and the United States; France’s role under President Macron in relation to Denmark, Greenland, and—critically—Ukraine; the appointment and function of Trump’s special envoy to Greenland; and the broader continuity of U.S. Arctic policy from the Biden administration to Trump. We conclude by assessing what these developments mean for the telecommunications industry in both the short and long term. This work forms part of our ongoing research into security policy and its implications for critical infrastructure.

Why the Invasion Story Doesn’t Hold Up.

Much of the media presents the situation as if the United States were preparing to invade Greenland, often drawing loose parallels to Venezuela. This framing has become the dominant narrative promoted by the some and amplified by leaders seeking to bolster Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen. This narrative is exaggerated at best. It conflates fundamentally different cases—like Iran and Venezuela—each rooted in long-standing, articulated U.S. policy objectives and analysis. Few voices in Denmark have been willing to challenge this portrayal or critically assess the government’s own actions. I can say this because my professional livelihood depends on accurate analysis and make my living by analyzing what is actually happening; I addressed this issue directly in an event at the Philippine Parliament in February 2025. For many media outlets, including those otherwise hostile to Trump, the Greenland story offers an opportunity to inflame sentiment—an opportunity that parts of the Danish government appear eager to use as a domestic political instrument at a time when voters have turned away from them in successive elections.

Denmark’s Arctic Commitments: What Was Known, What Was Promised, and What Was Delivered.

I will be the first to acknowledge that Donald Trump’s language is often brusque and confrontational. But serious analysis requires focusing on policy, not tone. Reviewing the relevant facts and placing them in context does not require defending Trump. This section seeks to restore transparency to a sequence of events that has been largely omitted from the debate. Specifically, Denmark’s prime minister made a series of commitments to the United States related to Greenland and Arctic security, failed to deliver on them, and has since avoided taking responsibility for that failure. To understand the current situation, one must look carefully at what happened before and after Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s visit to the White House on 4 December 2019.

Phase I: The Risks Were Well Known (2017–2019).

Well before the 2019 White House meeting, Danish and international experts had clearly identified Greenland and the Arctic as emerging strategic fault lines.

In short: the strategic stakes were neither new nor ambiguous. The security challenges in the Arctic are not new. They have been known for years and have intensified since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s increasingly assertive behavior.

Phase II: The White House Meeting and the Promise (December 2019).

On 4 December 2019, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen met President Trump at the White House. She pledged to invest DKK 1.5 billion (€200 million or USD $224 million) in security and to implement an Arctic Capacity package, formally adopted by the Danish Defense Ministry in 2021.
The commitments included enhanced surveillance, long-range drones, satellite monitoring, ground infrastructure, and early-warning capabilities—addressing the gaps identified by NATO and Danish intelligence.

Phase III: Non-Delivery and Strategic Pause (2020–2024).

Implementation, however, fell dramatically short.

  • May 2024: Denmark’s national broadcaster DR reported that only DKK 15 million (€2 million or $2.2 million) out of the promised DKK 1.5 billion (€200 million or USD $224 million) had actually been spent. After three years, Denmark had delivered about 1 percent of what was promised.

According to Danish Radio (DR), the only concrete outcome was funding Arctic basic education for 22 young Greenlanders in Kangerlussuaq. Promised investments in drones, satellite surveillance, substations, and radar systems remained unimplemented four and a half years after the White House meeting.

There are strong indications that Denmark effectively put its Arctic ambitions on hold once President Biden replaced Trump—despite Russia and China becoming more active in the region. This risk was underscored in April 2024 by Danish researcher Liselotte Odgaard, who warned that NATO was unable to defend itself adequately in the Arctic.

Phase IV: China as Leverage—and Alarm in Washington (2017–2025).

Complicating matters further, Greenland has repeatedly engaged with China to pressure Denmark and Western partners.

These statements triggered concern in Washington and Copenhagen. As many have noted, it is difficult to pursue a close security partnership with the United States while simultaneously courting strategic engagement with China.

Phase V: Escalation, Then Money (2025).

After renewed tensions—and Trump’s characteristically provocative rhetoric—Denmark moved quickly and re-upped its commitment, with the Defense Ministry issuing two agreements.

Only after sustained pressure did Denmark begin to deliver at scale. Its current Arctic investments are not only historically large but exceed those of any other NATO country in the region.

Credibility, Communication, and Consequences.

The episodes likely reduced the credibility of both Prime Minister Frederiksen and Denmark. From a U.S. perspective operating under a “trust but verify” approach—and amid a deteriorating global security environment—concerns about reliability have only grown. For American policymakers, Greenland represents a strategic gap between Russia and North America. Given the record, it is understandable that U.S. officials question Denmark’s reliability—a point noted by Greenlandic newspaper Sermitsiaq. This emphasis on verification was further reinforced when the Danish Armed Forces released a tone-deaf press statement in December 2025 announcing the purchase of 15 sled dogs for the Sirius Patrol—an announcement that sat uneasily alongside the scale and urgency of the Arctic security challenge.

Early this month Prime Minister Frederiksen issued a statement statement co-signed by President Macron of France, Chancellor Merz of Germany, Prime Minister Meloni of Italy, Prime Minister Tusk of Poland, Prime Minister Sánchez of Spain, and Prime Minister Starmer of the United Kingdom. While the statement plays well in a European context, it is likely to have the opposite effect in Washington, where it may be perceived as a pan-European provocation rather than a constructive intervention. Frederiksen seems to believe that her difficulties can be resolved by assembling visible European backing. In practice, this strategy is more likely to harden U.S. positions than to soften them.

Understanding Trump Without Excusing Him.

People should spend more time examining why the president of the United States—who bears responsibility for the security of 340 million Americans—reacts as he does, particularly given commitments Denmark’s prime minister has made to Washington and failed to deliver. From an American perspective, this is not about rhetoric, but about credibility and security in a strategically exposed region.

It is also necessary to acknowledge Denmark’s long-standing neglect of Greenland. For generations, Denmark has largely treated Greenland as a budget line—sending an annual transfer rather than investing systematically in the foundations of a self-sustaining society. Greenland’s future does not hinge on oil or rare earths, but on opportunities in fisheries, tourism, infrastructure, and service industries that require long-term development, not episodic self-interested attention.

The contrast with the Faroe Islands is instructive. Another part of the Danish Kingdom, the Faroe Islands have, at least in theory, reached a point where they could function without subsidies from Denmark. Greenland has not—and that is not something to be proud of. I know Greenland well, and I care deeply about it; Denmark’s record there is uncomfortable to confront.

At the same time, it would be neither fair nor accurate to place the responsibility entirely on Denmark. A sustainable path forward will not come from symbolic gestures or inflated rhetoric, but from a constructive dialogue that brings Denmark and the United States to the table with the Greenlanders—focused on responsibility, investment, and long-term stability.

French Rhetoric, Danish Reality, and the Ukraine Ledger.

Put your money where your mouth is is a useful frame of reference in security matters. It is worth examining the ledger of the loudest voices alongside their actual financial and military contributions. France, under President Emmanuel Macron, has expressed political support for Denmark and Prime Minister Frederiksen on Greenland, but France’s financial support to Ukraine is limited. Not “beaucoup”—indeed, tres petit.

Strand Consult analyzed the relationship between European countries’ use of Chinese telecom equipment, their consumption of Russian energy, and their military aid to Ukraine across 31 countries. That analysis is summarized here: What is the impact of the EU elections on the telecom industry? We lupdated the data in our 25th Anniversary Global Mobile Telecom Review & 2026 Predictions using figures from the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker, measuring military aid from the start of the war through August 2025 on a per-capita basis. The contrast is stark.

Denmark provided €1,536 per capita, compared with just €89 per capita from France. Other large European countries lag significantly: Germany (€210), the UK (€197), Italy (€28), and Spain (€16). The US investment amounts to €185 or $200 per capita. I presented these findings at a conference held in U.S. Senate in December 2025 and attended by Ukrainian MPs.

In absolute terms, Denmark has provided nearly €2 billion more in military aid to Ukraine than France over the first three and a half years of the war. By contrast in 2024 alone, France spent €3.5 billion on Russian energy—the same amount it provided in military aid to Ukraine over the first three years. Across Europe, spending on Russian energy over the past four years now exceeds total military support for Ukraine.

Despite this record, France has opportunistically positioned itself as the significant security actor and staunch supporter of Greenland, including the announcement that it will open a consulate there. In practice, Macron’s calls for greater support for Ukraine often translate into NATO allies purchasing French weapons—meaning Denmark has almost spent more on French arms than France has provided in military aid to Ukraine the first three years. This pattern extends beyond defense. Strand Consult has documented how the partly state-owned French satellite operator Eutelsat continued to broadcast propagandistic Russian state television to much of Russia, as reported by Børsen.

At the same time, France has resisted EU sanctions on Russia’s satellite operator RSCC, while Airbus—closely tied to U.S. technology and NASA—has avoided transparency about its activities in China. In war, credibility is measured in actions, not words. By that measure, the distance between French rhetoric and Danish reality is difficult to ignore.

Looking at the ledger, Denmark may have fallen short on Greenland, but it has delivered for Ukraine. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen deserves some credit for that. It was, however, a mistake to be less than forthright with the Americans about Greenland security commitments. Rather than seeking sympathy from other European leaders after thundering “Daddy Donald,” she should have pressed those same leaders to increase their contributions to Ukraine. If Europe claims to prioritize security, that is where the commitment should be demonstrated.

Special Envoys Are a Standard Practice; the Selective Outrage Is Predictable.

There has been considerable attention in Denmark to the fact that the United States uses special envoys. This is neither unusual nor limited to crisis situations. The use of special envoys is a long-standing practice employed by every U.S. president, as documented by the American Foreign Service Association and reflected across administrations, including President Biden’s use of special envoys in the Arctic. Portraying special envoys as instruments reserved for conflict zones is therefore a mischaracterization; the role is a routine and well-established tool of U.S. diplomacy.

It is also worth noting that Denmark itself has gone even further in experimenting with unconventional diplomatic forms. Seven years ago, Denmark became the first country to establish a special embassy in Silicon Valley with the explicit purpose of engaging directly with major technology companies, based on the argument that these firms had more power than nation states. Denmark even named an official “tech ambassador”, Casper Klynge (Here’s how he described his role for CBS News). After some years, he left the job to work for Microsoft, effectively making this experiment a Danish taxpayer-funded internship for an American tech giant.

Klynge was succeeded by Anne Marie Engtoft, who explained to the Danish newspaper Information that her mandate was to engage directly with U.S. technology companies because of their growing power over daily life. In practice, Denmark formalized direct diplomatic relations with large private companies in the United States, largely bypassing the U.S. government. One might reasonably ask how such an arrangement would be perceived if the United States appointed an ambassador whose sole purpose was to liaise directly with Danish shipping companies like Maersk or pharmaceutical giant Novo Nordisk.

This pattern of subnational and nontraditional diplomacy extends further. In August, Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen signed a commercial cooperation agreement with the state of California, an initiative described by the Confederation of Danish Industry as “Newsom and Løkke sign cooperation agreement.” Given the substantial autonomy of U.S. states—comparable in some respects to Greenland’s autonomy within the Danish realm—the United States’ approach to Greenland is not fundamentally different from Denmark’s own engagement with California or its direct diplomatic outreach to major technology companies.

The Arctic Didn’t Change—Only the Tone Did.

In 2024 President Biden appointed a special envoy to Greenland and the Arctic. Michael Sfraga served as Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs within a broader institutional framework, including the Office of the U.S. Coordinator for the Arctic Region and the National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The key distinction was procedural rather than substantive: Sfraga held the formal title of ambassador and was therefore Senate-confirmed.

Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski (R) strongly supported the creation and institutionalization of this role, both at the time of Sfraga’s appointment in 2024 and more recently in endorsing the codification of the Arctic ambassador position. Under the Trump administration, a similar Arctic-focused function has been maintained with Tom Dans playing a key role. What is often overlooked is the substantive continuity between administrations. At a security conference in Oslo in September last year, Michael Sfraga—despite having been appointed by a Democratic president—articulated positions on Greenland and the Arctic that closely mirror those expressed by Trump, including the strategic importance of Greenland and the risks of neglect. The message is consistent: Greenland must not not been forgotten, and Arctic security remains a bipartisan concern.

It seems that Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen inflate the current atmosphere to cast themselves as the defenders of the Danish realm. Given their weak position in domestic politics, the crisis narrative may be the last card they have left to play, and it is unlikely to be enough as Denmark approaches its next election.

Crisis Inflation and the Risk of Strategic Self-Deception.

Denmark has long known the Arctic security challenge. The facts show that Denmark has for many years recognized that there are major defense challenges in the Arctic and not least in Greenland. This recognition led Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen to promise President Donald Trump during her 2019 White House visit that Denmark would invest in Arctic security. When Trump left office, the promise was dropped and replaced with an Arctic security education for 22 young Greenlanders.

Upon returning to the White House, Trump—responsible for the security of 340 million Americans—again stressed the urgency of strengthening Arctic security. Central to this effort is a proposed “Golden Dome” missile defense system designed to counter the military capabilities Russia has established in the Arctic, as repeatedly outlined in NATO assessments. The world Trump re-entered is markedly more dangerous than the one he left. Russia has invaded Ukraine, and many European NATO members suffer from hollowed-out defense capabilities following decades of underinvestment. Throughout this period, American taxpayers have largely financed Europe’s security, while Europe has directed public funds toward welfare rather than defense.

Under the Biden administration, American taxpayers have financed a substantial share of the military assistance provided to Ukraine. Several major European countries, including France, Spain, and Italy, have contributed relatively limited military support, even as Europe spent vast sums on Russian energy. By contrast, smaller countries—led by Denmark—have made disproportionately large military contributions to Ukraine.

One of Trump’s first moves was to raise NATO’s level of ambition. With the exception of Spain, alliance members agreed to increase their defense contributions to a combined level of 3.5 percent plus 1.5 percent, amounting to 5 percent of GDP. At the same time, Trump has pursued negotiations with Russia from a position of strengthened Western deterrence, seeking a peace agreement that includes Ukraine and Europe

Just before Trump returned to office, the Assad regime in Syria collapsed. Soon after, Trump—working with several Arab states—set the first phase of a peace agreement between Israel and Palestine in motion.  On January 3, U.S. forces removed Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela. That same day, Washington sent an unmistakable message to authoritarian regimes in Iran, Cuba, North Korea, China, and Russia: do not test the United States—it will use effective force to achieve its strategic objectives.

A Crisis That Could Have Been Avoided.

The crisis between Denmark, the United States and, Greenland could have been avoided. The Danish government, headed by Mette Fredriksen and Lars Løkke-Rasmussen, sees an opportunity to save their political lives in a period when it looks as if they will lose many seats in the next election.

The story that Trump would invade Greenland came out of question from a journalist who asked the President on Air Force One whether he would use military means to gain control of Greenland. Trump’s answer was that he could not rule out any means, a classic politician’s answer to retain strategic ambiguity and keep others on their toes.

When Trump says he wants to own or control Greenland, it is not meant literally. What Trump is likely saying is that there is a major security problem in the Arctic, and Greenland is the linchpin. Denmark failed to secure its territory: Danish PM Mette Frederiksen promised Trump in 2019 to invest in Arctic security and didn’t follow through.

In practical terms, Trump knows that he must take figurative “ownership” of Greenland if security is to be delivered, and he has just three years to do it. He knows that Europe is skilled at rhetoric but poor at follow-through, as France’s Macron illustrating the point. He has also learned that only when confronted with direct pressure do European governments meaningfully increase military contributions and defense investment.

The United States has long-standing agreements with Denmark that allow it to increase its military presence in Greenland with relative ease. In that sense, the Danish government is correct that the United States can deploy on the island without purchasing it. The region, however, is not politically settled. Many Greenlanders seek independence from Denmark—an aspiration that remains economically unrealistic given the scale of Danish subsidies to the Greenlandic economy. This dynamic creates a strategic wild card, as Greenland continues to engage with Chinese overtures, potentially undermining security efforts in the region.

Greenland’s economic challenges fall into two categories: Denmark’s limited efforts to develop Greenlandic society and Greenland’s own inability to execute an agenda of economic independence. By contrast, the Faroe Islands, another part of the Danish realm, have successfully pursued economic independence. Greenland, however, operates under Arctic conditions that impose physical constraints, significantly increasing costs and complicating development.

Greenlandic leaders are not naïve; they deliberately play the China card. Beijing is repeatedly used as leverage to extract greater financial and political concessions from Denmark and the United States. This tactic—monetizing Chinese interest to apply pressure on Western partners—was evident most recently shortly after the current Greenlandic government took office 28th March 2025.

Calculated Escalation.

The story that the United States will take over Greenland, population 57,000 people, has escalated unnecessarily. The Danish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, facing political headwinds, used Venezuela to whip up a mood to gain voters’ sympathy. Now four out of ten Danes believe Trump will invade Greenland.

There is also a method to Trump’s use of the media. He signals that close allies—even friends since the founding like Denmark—will face pressure if they fail to deliver. In the case of Greenland, the objective is not ownership per se but addressing the Arctic’s growing security challenges.

This week Danish and Greenlandic foreign ministers Lars Løkke-Rasmussen and Vivian Motzfeldt meet with Marco Rubio. Such meetings can produce constructive results. It is often the case that Trump first pees on people, and then Marco Rubio wipes them off. The is classic good cop-bad cop play.

Much of the current debate is consumed by language, tone, and hyperbole, while the underlying security threats are treated as secondary. Attention has focused on what is said rather than on what is happening. This is striking given that Russia is already at Europe’s door.

There is little doubt that hostility toward Trump has fueled a media dynamic that amplifies outrage while glossing over analysis. Most coverage focuses on rhetoric, with less attention paid to Denmark’s role—and relative inaction.

Denmark’s behavior is part of a broader European pattern: strong on declarations, weak on delivery. Europe repeatedly demonstrates an ability to articulate the right intentions while struggling to produce concrete results. It is both troubling and revealing that European governments tend to act only when external pressure becomes unavoidable—rather than when threats are already visible.

Europe should not require provocation from Washington to do what’s needed for their own security.

Impact to the Telecom Industry and the New Global Playbook.

The Greenland–Denmark–United States dynamic matters far beyond the Arctic. It has direct relevance for countries across the world—and especially for telecom operators operating in NATO markets—where infrastructure, security, and geopolitics increasingly intersect. For more than two decades, Strand Consult has analyzed telecom infrastructure policy across major regions, including the United States, Europea, South Korea, Japan, India, Latin America, Africa, and China. That work documents how many countries moved to restrict Chinese suppliers such as Huawei and ZTE well before Donald Trump’s first election in 2016, underscoring that today’s debates are rooted in long-standing security assessments rather than transient political personalities.

Strand Consult suggests that the following lessons inform a New Global Telecom Playbook: (1) Telecom infrastructure is now security infrastructure, integral to defense, intelligence, and resilience; (2) rhetoric does not substitute for delivery, as credibility is measured in deployment, not declarations; (3) vendor trust is fundamentally a geopolitical—not merely technical—assessment, driven by ownership, state influence, and legal obligations; (4) security policy shows continuity across political cycles, meaning leadership changes do not reset risk assessments; (5) NATO will increasingly shape telecom markets as defense modernization ties network access to trusted-vendor compliance; (6) delay is itself a strategic choice, as networks deployed today will remain in service for decades; (7) commercial exposure to China increasingly collides with national security obligations; (8) NATO and EU pressure will be applied asymmetrically to lagging countries and operators; (9) telecom operators must decide whether they are commodity providers or trusted infrastructure partners; and (10) the new global environment rewards early alignment and foresight, while hedging between blocs increasingly signals unreliability.

In 2012, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard of the Social Democratic Party became the first world leader to restrict Chinese equipment in mobile networks, a move later followed by the United States and many others. Similar restrictions were subsequently embedded in national laws in countries including Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Estonia, India, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Portugal, South Korea, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Shortly after the arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in Canada in December 2018, Strand Consult explained in “The story behind the Huawei story – it’s not a politically-orchestrated car accident in slow motion” that she was not a victim of a trade war, but was instead implicated in violations of the Wassenar Arrangement on international security, which restricts the export and sale of nine categories of conventional weapons and “dual-use” technologies. In November 2020, Strand Consult further observed in “Would a new President change the US view of the security of Huawei and ZTE in 5G networks?” that a change in U.S. leadership would not alter these restrictions—a conclusion that has since proven correct.

Both Trump and Biden administrations called for ripping and replacing Chinese equipment, and preferably not buying equipment from untrusted vendors in the first place. The first Trump Administration featured a Clean Networks effort led by Ambassador Keith Krach, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment which called on using equipment from democratically aligned countries.

The initiative brought together countries and companies representing more than half of global GDP and promised a trusted network built on components supplied by providers from democratic countries. Yet the commitments many governments and mobile operators made to the first Trump administration under the Clean Network initiative closely resemble the Arctic security assurances Denmark gave Trump in 2019: ambitious in rhetoric, uneven in delivery. In both cases, it is not difficult to identify nations and operators that ultimately failed to follow through on their promises.

NATO will play an important role.

NATO countries are modernizing their defense communications systems, meaning large sums will be invested in advanced equipment. Nations need these solutions, and the shopping list is long. Telecom providers investigate this for new and expanded sources of revenue in conjunction with 5G and 5G private networks though the exact mapping is still underway.

The war in Ukraine and shifting geopolitical realities has dramatically changed the global outlook. Recent conflicts have underscored the strategic centrality of communications—from the decisive role of drones and satellite networks in Ukraine, to intelligence and cyber-espionage dynamics in the Israel–Iran confrontation, to electronic jamming operations over Caracas, the use of communications interception in Caribbean drug interdiction, the deployment of Russian Krasukhaelectronic warfare jammers, the NATO Joint Viking exercises in the Nordics, and submarine cable skirmishes, all of which demonstrate how modern military operations increasingly depend on control of advanced communications networks.

For those working in telecommunications, these developments raise critical questions about how shifting security dynamics intersect with the industry and how NATO’s evolving priorities may affect telecom operators both within and beyond the alliance. Strand Consult addresses these issues in its report “How to ensure NATO´s next generation weapons access to modern communication solutions” which examines EU legislation aimed at securing telecommunications infrastructure and serves as a practical template for operators and authorities in NATO countries. The report is published against the backdrop of NATO’s 2025 Summit in The Hague, an inflection point that will bring clear opportunities for some mobile operators and significant challenges for others. Drawing on analysis across multiple markets, Strand Consult assesses the new commercial opportunities emerging from NATO’s investment plans and what it will take for telecommunications companies to capitalize on them. The report concludes that NATO is likely to apply increasing pressure on member states and operators that cannot provide access to networks built on vendors classified as trusted in the future.

The EU´s 5G Toolbox.

The United States is not alone in seeking to ensure that citizens have access to secure communications networks. The European Commission, together with the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), and the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communication (BEREC) developed an EU-wide coordinated risk assessment. Based on identified risks, the toolbox established both strategic (non-technical) and technical mitigation measures, which EU member states pledged to follow. The framework requires that both risk assessments and mitigation measures be satisfied for 5G equipment suppliers to be deemed secure and trusted.

Launched in 2020, al 27 EU member states have reaffirmed commitments to the 5G Toolbox was and pledged full implementation. By that point, 24 states had adopted or were in the process of adopting the toolbox, often through new legislation empowering national authorities to conduct security assessments, though only 11 had implemented restrictions on high-risk vendors. Because hardware risks are inherently non-technical and 5G networks are critical national infrastructure, effective mitigation has been deemed to require non-technical measures, including assessing suppliers’ risk profiles and applying restrictions or exclusions where necessary—an approach that, in practice, is driving the de facto removal of Huawei and ZTE from European mobile networks.

Due to the non-technical nature of hardware risks and the criticality of 5G networks to a nation, effective mitigation of non-technical factors and risks has been deemed to require non-technical mitigations e.g. exclusions by “assessing the risk profile of suppliers and applying restrictions for suppliers considered to be high risks-including necessary exclusions to effectively mitigate risks for key network assets”.

Germany´s Challenge.

In Germany, Chancellor Friedrich Merz delayed implementing the EU’s 5G Toolbox, later announcing that Chinese equipment would be banned only from 6G networks (Bloomberg). As 5G is likely to remain in use until around 2050—when Merz will be 95—this decision effectively allows systemic risk from Chinese equipment to persist for decades.

By contrast, Tim Höttges—CEO of Deutsche Telekom, Chairman of T-Mobile US, and supervisory board member of Mercedes-Benz Group—defended the continued use of Chinese equipment in critical infrastructure in a LinkedIn post, arguing that future technology leadership, not cost alone, will define the next decade and questioning whether engagement or protectionism is the right approach. An unofficial translation reads, “Our debates at the moment are all about the USA: tariffs, Trump, protectionism…”… “But the next ten years will not only be dominated by the fact that China is a cheap supplier, but because it is a technology leader. . .We must ask ourselves how we deal with this situation. Do we want to learn and benefit from the Chinese? Do we want to trade with the Chinese? Or do we want to close the borders in a protectionist fashion?” This position likely reflects Mercedes-Benz’s commercial interests in China and echoes former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s approval of Russian gas dependency, which later destabilized Europe’s security and energy markets.

Deutsche Telekom relies heavily on Huawei equipment—58% in Germany, 100% in Greece and Austria, 50% in Croatia, 70% in Poland, and 100% in the Czech Republic—and its T-Systems unit resells Huawei-based cloud solutions. Operators following this model are likely to face direct pressure from the United States and indirect pressure from NATO, even as they argue that reliance on Chinese suppliers reduces dependence on the U.S., despite viable alternatives from Europe and Korea.

The EU is expected to update the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) next year restricting high-risk suppliers’ access to critical infrastructure (CIRCABC). The next proposal for the EU’s Digital Markets Act will likely clarify limits on Chinese equipment use in critical infrastructure and prevent EU financing for such equipment. Political pressure on China and its equipment in critical infrastructure will increase as mobile operators begin providing solutions for NATO communications, first responders, and other critical services.

Spain´s Challenge.

One of the countries that has already said that they cannot or will not live up to the new 5% NATO target is Spain. A few days before the meeting, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez sent a clear signal that Spain would not contribute to the community in the same way that their military contribution to the war in Ukraine has been quite limited.

Strand Consult´s latest study Is there a correlation between European nations’ level of Chinese telecom equipment, the consumption of Russian energy, and military aid to Ukraine?  documents that 32% of Spain’s 5G infrastructure is supplied by Chinese vendors. Over the first three years of the war, Spain provided €0.79 billion in military aid to Ukraine. In 2024, Spain spent €2.60 billion on Russian energy, equivalent to 0.17% of GDP, while its military support for Ukraine amounted to just 0.018% of GDP. By contrast, Denmark’s 5G infrastructure contains no Chinese equipment. Over the same three-year period, Denmark provided €7.54 billion in military aid to Ukraine. In 2024, Denmark spent €0.02 billion on Russian energy, equal to 0.05% of GDP, while its military support for Ukraine reached 0.67% of GDP.

The foundation for the implementation of EU’s 5G Toolbox in Spain is “The National 5G Cybersecurity Scheme” (ENS5G), a law approved last year. The key problem is that the law ENS5G doesn’t establish any timeline to initiate a procedure. In practice, this means that although the law has been passed by parliament and Spain has notified the EU, no timeline or implementation plan has been established. Strand Consult’s report “How to ensure next generation weapons and modern communication solutions for NATO” xamines EU and Spanish legislation intended to ensure that Spain has access to secure telecommunications infrastructure. The report maps infrastructure supplied by vendors deemed untrusted and reviews contracts that Spanish telecom operators have entered into with the Ministry of Defense, the Guardia Civil, the Spanish Navy, and other public authorities. These contracts rely on communications solutions based on equipment from suppliers that both the Spanish Parliament and the European Union have identified as unsuitable for use in Spain. For more discussion of the security policy, see John Strand’s presentation at a conference in the Senate of Spain The new geopolitical reality: how to build and protect information society infrastructure.

The Bottom Line: Security promises must be delivered, not declared. Trust is earned through execution.

Despite the media hyperventilation, there is little credible basis to believe the United States intends to take over Greenland. Greenland remains part of the Kingdom of Denmark with a high degree of self-government, and while long-term independence is an aspiration for many Greenlanders, it would require a substantial strengthening of the Greenlandic economy, which today remains heavily dependent on Danish subsidies.

In 2019, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen made a series of commitments to President Trump regarding Arctic security that Denmark did not initially deliver on. After years of underinvestment in Greenland, Denmark subsequently announced a major shift, committing DKK 42 billion (€5.6 billion) to Arctic security. While this investment is significant, the earlier failure undermined Washington’s trust.

The U.S. focus on Greenland is not driven by oil or rare earths but by national security concerns and the strategic need to close what American policymakers view as a gap between Russia and North America. U.S. skepticism toward Denmark has been compounded by Greenland’s periodic engagement with China, which raises concerns in Washington about long-term alignment.

There is hope that Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen and Greenlandic Foreign Minister Vivian Motzfeldt, together with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, can bring this issue to a constructive resolution.

More broadly, this episode offers important lessons for governments and telecommunications companies worldwide. The United States’ view of Greenland as strategically vital to the security of 340 million Americans is a reality that other actors must acknowledge and understand. This is a reality European leaders should not ignore, as it bears directly on the security of hundreds of millions more people across the continent.

Strand Consult’s knowledge.

In 2025, Strand Consult published numerous research notes and reports, featured expert guest contributors on its guest blog, and saw its analysis cited in over 1,000 news stories worldwide. Strand Consult’s work reaches all continents, and its readership continues to grow. For 25 years, Strand Consult has issued annual predictions, and our historical record demonstrates consistent accuracy.

Moving toward 2026, the global landscape remains dynamic. Technological, political, and economic shifts continue to create both challenges and opportunities. In this environment, transparency, translation, and foresight remain more critical than ever for companies and policymakers navigating a rapidly changing world. Sign up for Strand Consult’s free Research Notes to stay informed.

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