Greenland, USA and Denmark – Ménage à trois now with a happy ending

Greenland, the United States and Denmark just signed a landmark agreement. The ménage à trois has ended happily—though not necessarily equally. Greenland, the United States and Denmark have signed a landmark agreement that does far more than update decades-old defense arrangements. It redraws the practical framework for Arctic security, gives the United States greater freedom to operate in Greenland, commits Denmark and other NATO allies to greater military and financial responsibility, and puts clearer limits on the role of China, Russia and other non-NATO powers.

This note annotates the agreement and explains what led to it, what each party gained, and what it means for NATO and the telecommunications industry. Strand Consult’s assessment is that Greenland and the United States emerge as the principal winners, while Denmark has conceded more (especially money) than it originally intended. The agreement also sends a broader message to NATO allies: those that benefit from U.S. security commitments will increasingly be expected to shoulder more responsibility themselves—and to secure their critical infrastructure accordingly.

For the telecommunications industry, the implications are substantial. The agreement points toward greater demand for trusted networks, mission-critical communications and local infrastructure capable of supporting a more active U.S. and NATO presence in the Arctic. In Strand Consult’s view, the direction of travel is clear—and it is remarkably consistent with its prediction in January 2026.

Following the 2024 election, Donald Trump made brutal statements about geopolitics in Greenland and Panama. It seems that Panama resolved the challenges behind closed doors and has received little attention since.

The story is completely different for Greenland, which turned into a media circus. Strand Consult, based in Denmark and expert in Arctic communications, described the Greenland situation in January 2026 in Greenland, USA and Denmark – Ménage à trois, what it means for the telecommunications industry. The outcome, culminating in the agreement just signed, suggests that Strand Consult correctly predicted how things would be resolved.

For a discussion of the historical context, see CEO John Strand’s presentation at the Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum’s conference in the Philippine Parliament in February 2025.

The Background

Denmark has long recognized the serious defense challenges in the Arctic, particularly in Greenland. This recognition led Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen to promise President Donald Trump that Denmark would invest in Arctic security at her White House visit in 2019. When Trump left office, she dropped that and replaced it with an Arctic security education program for 22 young Greenlanders.

Strand Consult’s January 2026 note explained how Greenland has flirted with China. In 2017 Greenlandic officials traveled to China to negotiate airport construction and financing from the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. Only after U.S. pressure did Denmark step in with €100 million to block Chinese involvement. In Spring 2025 Greenland’s new foreign minister, Vivian Motzfeldt told China’s Xinhua News Agency that strengthening ties with China would be a priority. Shortly thereafter, Greenland’s minister for business Environment and Energy Naaja Nathanielsen told the Financial Times that if the EU and the U.S. would not invest, China should be allowed to do so.

In addition to China, there is discussion about Russia in Greenland. Some claim that neither China nor Russia poses a threat to region. The facts tell a different story. China considers itself a “near-Arctic state” and has established a significant presence, including through close cooperation with Russia, which China supports in numerous areas. Newsweek journalist Didi Kirsten Tatlow documented these developments in 2024, see China’s Expanding Arctic Ambitions Challenge the U.S. and NATO and Backstory – Tracking China in the Arctic.

The United States had legitimate reasons to be concerned about the security challenges in the regions. While that does not excuse Trump’s conduct toward Greenland and Denmark, there was real substance to the criticism of Denmark’s handling of security in Greenland. The question is whether the United States could have achieved the same result through diplomacy and a more constructive approach.

The agreement

Predictably, Danish and international media portray the agreement as a victory for Denmark and Greenland. The diplomatic interpretation is that it is a good agreement for all three parties.

Strand Consult sees it differently. We believe Greenland and the United States are the winners, while Denmark conceded more than it originally intended.

At the same time, the underlying agreements clearly needed updating. The new accord amends and supplements the 1951 Defense Agreement and the 2004 Igaliku Agreement, while future-proofing the arrangements in the event of Greenlandic independence. It also establishes clearer constraints to prevent Greenland from developing strategic relationships with China, Russia or other non-NATO states.

Here are the key elements of the agreement and why they matter:

“The agreement reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark, and recognizing that the People of Greenland constitute a people pursuant to international law with the right to self-determination…. Recognizing the economic, social, and cultural rights of the People of Greenland, including with respect to their lands and their way of life, including hunting, fishing, and other traditional, cultural, historical, future activities, and developments;

“Recognizing the United States’ indispensable historical and ongoing contributions to the security and defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area, including significant sacrifices and billions of dollars spent over the better part of a century, dating back to before World War II and the establishment of NATO, and the irreplaceable role the United States military plays in the defense of the territory of Greenland now and in the future;

“This Agreement amending and supplementing the Defense Arrangements shall facilitate the ability of the Parties to take any measures necessary or appropriate to carry out expeditiously their respective and joint responsibilities in Greenland, including to defend the North Atlantic. Treaty area, Greenland, and the American continent, while respecting the interests of and providing benefits for the Greenlandic society.”

Importantly, the agreement respects the sovereignty of Greenland and Denmark and their sovereignty and the right of Greenlanders to govern their own country. It makes clear that the United States must comply with Greenlandic law. Moreover, the agreement is firmly anchored in NATO cooperation, ensuring that even if Greenland becomes independent, it would remain within the NATO framework. Additionally the agreement notes,

“The Parties shall make best use of the procedures set out in the Defense Arrangements, including the 1951 Defense Agreement and the 2004 Igaliku Agreement, as amended and supplemented herein, to enable the following:

“The United States shall be allowed to modernize and expand its activities in Pituffik Space Base;

The United States shall be allowed to establish an additional Defense Area at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig in accordance with modalities and technical details to be mutually agreed by the Parties;

The United States may establish additional defense areas in Greenland and strengthen its military operations or facilities. Either Party may identify the need for a new Defense Area for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, Greenland, and the American continent. Such Party shall provide a proposal describing the location, scope, size, and types of activities of the proposed Defense Area as well as other modalities such as mitigating measures, including those necessary to take account of the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding and the 2004 Joint Declaration. The Parties shall immediately convene to engage in consultations through the Permanent Committee to decide implementation details based on mutual agreement. If no agreement is reached within 90 days at the Permanent Committee, consultations shall escalate to the deputy minister level, followed by the minister level;

“The United States shall award all contracts to commercial enterprises for goods and services related to the establishment, maintenance and servicing, including, but not limited to, construction and dismantling projects, of Defense Areas in Greenland to Greenlandic sources to the maximum extent possible, taking into account the capabilities and feasibility of such sources to implement contracts. To secure contracts to Greenlandic sources, the Parties agree to update the 2020 Diplomatic Notes accordingly.”

Thus, the agreement allows the United States to expand its military presence in Greenland, including modernizing Pituffik Space Base and expanding to two additional bases in Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig. The US can also procure services from local Greenlandic businesses when they meet U.S. requirements.

The agreement continues with a discussion of Golden Dome.

“The Kingdom of Denmark together with Greenland shall review requests to establish unmanned military installations in Greenland outside of the Defense Areas under accelerated governmental approval procedures. The request shall include a proposal describing the location, scope, size, and types of activities of the proposed unmanned military installation, as well as other modalities such as mitigating measures, including those necessary to take account of the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding and the 2004 Joint Declaration. Article IV of this Agreement shall apply to the establishment, maintenance, and servicing of such unmanned military installations.

“Recognizing the Parties’ shared interest in allowing the United States to have military access to the territory of Greenland to the extent necessary to defend the North Atlantic Treaty area, Greenland, and the American continent, including through establishment of a Golden Dome defense system;”

Notably, the agreement gives the United States the opportunity to establish unmanned military installations in Greenland outside the designated Defense Areas. In practice, this could allow the United States to expand military infrastructure—including installations associated with the Golden Dome missile defense system—beyond the three existing American bases. Strand Consult identified this possibility as early as February 2025 in the article “Iron Dome over the Arctic – Trump’s interest in Greenland is about effective protection of North America with missile defense system” published in the Greenlandic newspaper Sermitsiaq.

The agreement continues as it discusses defense.

“As regards United States access to the rest of the territory of Greenland (including the Territorial Waters), the following shall apply:

• With a view to ensuring a secure and effective operation of the Defense Areas, the United States of America shall enjoy, for its public vessels and aircraft and its armed forces and vehicles, the right of free access to and movement between the Defense Areas through Greenland, including the Territorial Waters, by land, air and sea. This may also apply to unmanned military installations subject to agreement by the Parties on the modalities at the time of establishment;
• United States aircraft may fly over and land in any territory in Greenland, including the Territorial Waters, and United States public vessels may have undersea access to and movement within the Territorial Waters, without restriction except as mutually agreed upon by the Parties;
• United States public vessels shall be given such additional access to and movement within the Territorial Waters as is agreed to by the Parties at any given time to be required by the military situation for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, Greenland, and the American continent, or for other purposes as may be agreed by the Parties.
• These rights must be exercised in a manner that respects the Greenlandic society and the Greenlandic way of life, including hunting, fishing, and other traditional, cultural, historical, and other future activities, to the maximum extent possible.”

This point is particularly important from an international perspective. During the U.S. strikes on Iran, Spain and Italy, among others, restricted the use of their bases by the United States. The new agreement helps ensure that Greenland cannot similarly constrain the U.S. military’s ability to operate and manoeuvre in the Arctic.

The agreement further details cooperation.

“Security of the Defense Areas and prevention of espionage. The Parties agree that the territory in the vicinity of a Defense Area shall not be used in any manner that threatens the security of the Defense Area. In order to implement this requirement, the Parties intend to cooperate with respect to ensuring the security of the Defense Areas. The United States shall have the right to raise concerns regarding construction, or change of use in a manner that threatens a Defense Area, of any building, facility, or installation in the vicinity of the Defense Area. Upon such notification the Parties shall mutually determine what steps may be necessary to address any threat.

“The Parties shall work together to counter espionage in Greenland. Relevant authorities in the Kingdom of Denmark shall keep in close contact with relevant U.S. authorities and other partners to the fullest extent necessary to implement this Article.”

In practice, this point cements the close security cooperation that has existed between the United States and Denmark for decades. It is also clear that intelligence cooperation will deepen. This is one of many elements of the agreement that will strengthen cooperation within NATO. Indeed the agreement reflects this.

“The Kingdom of Denmark has strengthened and shall continue to strengthen its security posture in the Arctic through comprehensive, multi-domain approach encompassing land, maritime, air and space capabilities. Through enhanced presence, improved surveillance and increased cooperation and interoperability with NATO-Allies, the Kingdom of Denmark shall continue to address emerging threats and contribute to collective stability and security in the Arctic region.

“Establishment of manned or unmanned military installations by third states. No state that is not a member of NATO shall be allowed to establish its own manned or unmanned military installations in Greenland nor shall they be allowed a persistent presence of military forces in Greenland, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

Essentially the signed agreement commits Greenland to NATO and ensures that it works with Denmark that and other NATO countries to take greater responsibility for security in the region. The agreements details this with the following provisions to limit foreign direct investment and influence when adversarial risk is involved.

“Foreign direct investment and other activities. Given the threat to national security and public order posed by increased efforts by adversaries to expand influence and control in Greenland, the Parties agree that states or investors from a state that is not a member of NATO, a NATO partner, or an EU member state shall not be allowed to have (i) control, (ii) significant influence, or (iii) access to non-public information that may constitute a threat to national security or public order within Particularly Sensitive Sectors or Activities in the territory of Greenland (including the Territorial Waters), unless agreed between the Parties that the activities of such states or investors would not constitute a threat to national security or public order.

“The objective shall be ensured by Greenland in close cooperation with the authorities of the Kingdom of Denmark in its application of any of its current or future investment screening laws. Relevant authorities in the Kingdom of Denmark shall engage in close consultation with relevant United States authorities and other partners. The specific modalities for that close consultation shall be determined by the relevant authorities.”

Indeed Denmark has legislation governing the security assessment of telecommunications equipment and requiring the removal of equipment from untrusted suppliers. The Investment Screening Act forms part of the framework underpinning Denmark’s National Strategy for Cyber and Information Security. Security assessments are carried out by the Centre for Cyber Security (CFCS). Greenland is now developing similar legislation based on the Danish framework.

At the EU level, the European Commission proposed a new Cybersecurity Package in January 2026 to strengthen resilience and preparedness against evolving cyber and hybrid threats. At its core is a revised Cybersecurity Act (CSA2), which would update the EU cybersecurity framework, including rules addressing risks in ICT supply chains and high-risk third-country suppliers.

The package would apply across the 27 EU Member States and the three EEA countries— Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway—as well as Switzerland. It covers 18 sectors, including telecommunications.

Greenland is not part of the EU, however, so it remains to be seen whether and to what extent Greenland will align its legislation with CSA2.

What does this mean for other countries in NATO?

Some may view the agreement simply as a natural update of the arrangements the United States reached with Denmark in 1951 and with Denmark and Greenland in 2004. But it goes further. The United States has allies that benefit from its protection while also restricting its freedom of action.

During the U.S. strikes on Iran, for example, Spain and Italy reportedly restricted U.S. warplanes from using their military bases. The new agreement with Greenland and Denmark addresses this type of constraint by securing greater U.S. freedom of action in the Arctic.

The agreement also clearly cements NATO cooperation. Those who believe NATO is falling apart or that the United States is preparing to leave the alliance, should reconsider that view. The agreement makes clear that Denmark is taking greater responsibility for Arctic security, while other NATO countries are also prepared to contribute. The result will be a significant strengthening of Arctic defense capabilities in response to Russia’s—and, to a lesser extent, China’s—growing activities in the region.

The agreement also reinforces the hard line Denmark has taken toward commercial engagement with countries outside the NATO alliance, particularly China. In practical terms, this means Chinese companies will face restrictions on investing in critical infrastructure in Greenland, while Greenlandic companies will be restricted from using equipment from designated high-risk vendors in critical infrastructure such as telecommunications and energy. This includes suppliers such as Huawei and ZTE.

Similarly, Argentina and Chile have taken different approaches to Chinese satellite infrastructure. Argentina has allowed China to operate a satellite ground station, which has raised concerns about its potential military use. Chile, by contrast, halted plans by China to build similar ground stations for Chinese satellites.

These cases illustrate the broader security challenge of allowing strategic Chinese infrastructure in countries that cooperate closely with the United States, as covered by Newsweek in “China, Chile, U.S. and Space Observatory: What’s at Stake” and “China’s Space Infrastructure in Latin America Raises U.S. Security Concerns.”

The same strategic approach is visible in the bill Trump signed last Friday. H.R. 5334, the “Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026” expands statutory sanctions, tariffs and prohibitions targeting Russia and extends existing sanctions on Iran. The law gives the President new tools to pressure Russia by targeting its energy revenues and countries that continue to purchase Russian oil and gas or facilitate sanctions evasion. It also provides leverage in the dialogue with Xi, given China’s continued purchases of Iranian and Russian energy. The same tools can be used in discussions with NATO allies that continue to buy significant amounts of Russian energy.

Essentially, the United States has used the opportunity to put forward a model security agreement for NATO allies, covering defense, geopolitics and other strategic commitments.

Greenland and Denmark have signed an agreement with the United States that contains commitments the United States would like to see from other countries in its military alliance. At the same time, the U.S. Congress has given the president additional tools to pressure countries—notably to pushback against the purchase of Russian and Iranian energy, transaction which provide valuable revenue and indirect legitimacy to those regimes.

The stated U.S. objective is to reduce Iran’s support for proxy groups and to pressure Russia over its war against Ukraine. These tools could therefore become part of U.S. discussions with a range of countries. The message to NATO countries that host and benefit from U.S. forces could be straightforward: greater U.S. security commitments should be matched by greater commitments from the countries benefiting from them, including commitments of the kind Greenland and Denmark made in this agreement.

Two winners and a lonely Prime Minister

The agreement is clearly designed to be presented as a three-way win. But the outcome is more uneven: some parties gained more than others from the ménage à trois, even if that was not necessarily the intention. The US and Greenland came out of top, and Denmark is a third wheel of sorts. Here is Strand Consult’s analysis of the individual leaders:

Jens-Frederik Nielsen of Greenland held that the Greenlandic people, particularly ordinary Greenlanders, were caught in a political battle in which Mette Frederiksen chose to take a hard line with Donald Trump while seeking support from other European NATO countries.During this period, Denmark made many concessions to Greenland over historical grievances, while also assuming significantly greater economic responsibility for Greenland and for Arctic defense.From Nielsen’s perspective, Greenlanders are the biggest beneficiaries when considering both Denmark’s concessions and the agreement now concluded between Greenland, the United States and Denmark. Nielsen’s political skill was to capitalize on the crisis and use it to persuade the two larger parties to meet Greenland’s demands.

For U.S. President Donald Trump the agreement future-proofs the 1951 U.S.-Denmark Defense Agreement, renewed through the 2004 Igaliku Agreement, in the event that Greenland becomes independent. It also expands the U.S. military’s presence and creates a framework for the Golden Dome, although the precise scope of that system in Greenland remains to be determined.

Trump also succeeded in getting U.S. allies to step up their commitments to Arctic security, addressing one of his longstanding complaints about allied burden-sharing. At the same time, several European NATO countries have assumed greater responsibility for Arctic security. Greenland and Denmark have also granted the U.S. military operational opportunities that it does not enjoy in some other countries where U.S. forces are present. From Strand Consult’s perspective, Trump achieved key objectives: greater NATO responsibility and financial contribution, greater scope for the Golden Dome and stronger assurances that strategic adversaries will not gain a foothold in Greenland. These are points Strand Consult raised in its analysis presented to the Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum in the Philippine Parliament in February 2025.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen tried to trick Trump, first by reneging on a 2019 promise to the United States and then by appealing to NATO allies when he got angry. This performance worked well when she was facing a general election, where her attacks ensured that she could continue as Prime Minister of Denmark. It made her look like a strong leader during a crisis.

On the other hand, instead of entering into dialogue with Trump and finding a solution, she chose to attack Trump and play off a European leaders against him. It was a politically smart domestic move that made Trump the big villain.

The problem is that she now has an agreement with Trump, and the narrative that formed the foundation of her politics is gone. One is tempted to ask what Mette Frederiksen’s next narrative will be.

Her party has declined dramatically. In the 2024 European Parliament elections, the Social Democrats experienced a significant decline in voter support. In the 2025 municipal elections, the party declined nationally by 5.2 percentage points to 23.3% of the vote, with a decline in 89 of 98 municipalities. In the 2026 parliamentary election, the party declined by 5.6 percentage points to 21.9% of the vote, down from 27.5% in 2022.

More broadly, Prime Minister Frederiksen also gambled with legitimate security concerns for the Danish people. In practice, the Arctic region was neglected for many years, during which both Russia and China advanced their interests in the region. The Prime Minister’s actions could be considered politically risky, but also reckless.

Many see the process as ugly. No one ever said geopolitics was pretty. Indeed Trump’s approach is not polite, but the agreement appears to have brought Greenland to a better outcome. Trump has also demonstrated that he can press hard for his demands—and ultimately have those who felt wronged congratulate the parties on the negotiated result. Other countries may well be asked to make similar concessions to the United States. In any event, the agreement between Greenland, the United States and Denmark strengthens NATO and points toward a more capable and credible future for the alliance.

What does this mean for telecom?

As a result of the agreement, Greenland’s national telecommunications company Tusass, should expect that its submarine cable activities are on track for expansion. Increased U.S. activity in Greenland, particularly the more advanced installations the United States plans to establish, should create additional opportunities for Tusass.

A little over 500 days ago, the three Danish pension funds—ATP, PFA and PKA—sold their stakes in TDC to Macquarie at a significant loss. Under Danish legislation, the transaction required approval from the Danish authorities. The transaction has not yet been completed, and Strand Consult believes there is a high probability that the Danish state will now buy the three pension funds’ shares in TDC, following the agreement on Greenland.

Many of these opportunities were described in Strand Consult’s note, The Next Big Opportunity for Mobile Operators: Mission Critical Communication for Defense, Public Safety and Emergencies: https://strandconsult.dk/the-next-big-opportunity-for-mobile-operators-mission-critical-communication-for-defense-public-safety-and-emergencies/ With strengthened NATO cooperation, similar opportunities will extend to telecommunications operators that have chosen to exclude High-Risk Suppliers (HRS) from their networks.

The agreement sends a clear message to other NATO nations, particularly those in the alliance that host U.S. military forces. The fact is that, in 2019, all 27 EU Member States agreed to phase out High-Risk Suppliers from Europe’s 5G networks. With the launch of the EU’s 5G Toolbox, the EU and its 27 Member States sent a clear signal to Europe’s telecommunications companies that they should phase out the use of HRS in their networks as they upgraded from 4G to 5G. Most Europe’s operators understood this and chose to phase out HRS. The financial consequences have been marginal, as evidenced by these companies’ financial statements and earnings calls, where they have discussed the associated costs.

Exposure to HRS in the EU is now concentrated in a small number of Member States. There are approximately 100 5G networks in the EU, of which, at the beginning of 2026, 60 were supplied by trusted vendors (Samsung, Nokia, and Ericsson). Approximately 10 additional networks will be supplied exclusively by trusted suppliers by the time the Cyber Security Act (CSA 2) comes into effect, following the national implementation of the 5G Toolbox.

Approximately 30 networks still have between 35 and 100 percent of their radio access network (RAN) supplied by High-Risk Suppliers. This does not apply to the core network, which has already been upgraded for 5G using trusted suppliers. These networks are owned and operated by a limited number of operators across Europe that made a commercial decision to retain High-Risk Suppliers when upgrading their 4G equipment to 5G, and they continue to do so as of early 2026. These operators should have understood, based on the action taken by the European Commission and at least half of the EU Member States under the 5G Toolbox, that this was not a prudent decision.

Telecommunications operators in NATO countries that continue to rely on High-Risk Suppliers in their networks may increasingly find themselves treated as untrusted operators, with limited ability to provide telecommunications services to NATO. The agreement between Greenland, the United States and Denmark sends a clear signal about the direction of travel. It reinforces what Strand Consult has argued for years: trusted networks are becoming a prerequisite for trusted participation in the transatlantic security system.

Strand Consult’s knowledge

Strand Consult is an independent consultancy focused on the challenges of the global mobile telecom industry. It publishes research notes and reports and features expert contributors on its guest blog. Strand Consult’s work reaches all continents, is quoted in the media thousands of time each year, and its readership continues to grow. For almost 30 years, Strand Consult has issued annual predictions, and its historical record demonstrates consistent accuracy.

Moving ahead, the global landscape remains dynamic. Technological, political, and economic shifts continue to create both challenges and opportunities. In this environment, transparency, translation, and foresight remain important. Sign up for Strand Consult’s free Research Notes to stay informed.